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SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
ADMISSIBILITY OF CONFESSIONS OBTAINED DURING
ILLEGAL DETENTION
€,'fl-HE true test of admissibility is that the confession is made
'freely, voluntarily and without compulsion or inducement
of any sort."1 This rule was announced in the early case of Wilson
v. United States.! In Brain v. United States,3 decided by the court the
following year, this test was applied with the further explanation
that a confession to be voluntary must be free of any action on the
part of officials which is calculated to produce either hope or fear in
the mind of the accused.4 Subsequent cases cited and followed
this holding.5
It was not until 1942 that any material change was made in this
rule. In McNabb v. United States,' decided in that year, the pris-
oners were held from Wednesday night until Saturday morning
ing under constant interrogation from large numbers of arresting
officers. They were not allowed to see each other nor any outside
person, nor were they taken before a magistrate until the expira-
tion of this period. The court held that such detention without
arraignment was in violation of the Federal Code of Criminal
Procedure,7 stating:
1 Wilson v. United States, 162 U. S. 613, 623 (1896).
2 Ibid.
3 168 U. S. 532 (1897).
4 "The rule is not that in order to render a statement admissable the proof
must be adequate to establish that the particular communications contained in a
statement were voluntarily made, but it must be sufficient to establish that the
making of the statement was voluntary; that is to say that from the causes, which
the law treats as legally sufficient to engender in the mind of the accused hope or
fear in respect to the crime charged, the accused was not involuntarily impelled
to make a statement, when but for the improper influence he would have remained
silent." Id. at 549.
, Lisenba v. California, 314 U. S. 219 (1941); Wan v. United States, 266 U. S.
1 (1924); Hardy v. United States, 186 U. S. 224 (1902).
8 318 U. S. 332 (1942).
7 18 U. S. C. § 595 (1927) PERSONS ARRESTEx TAKEN BFFORE NEAREST OFFICER FOR
HEARINGS: "It shall be the duty of the marshal, his deputy, or other officer, who may
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"The evidence elicited from the petitioners in the circumstances dis-
closed here must be excluded. For in their treatment of the petitioners
the arresting officers assumed functions which congress has explicitly
denied them. They subjected the accused to the pressures of a pro-
cedure which is wholly in-compatible with the vital but very restricted
duties of the investigating and arresting officers." ...
"We hold only that a decent regard for the duty of courts as agencies
of justice and custodians of liberty forbids that men should convict
upon evidence secured under the circumstances revealed here."
It is not clear from the opinion whether the illegal detention,
or the continued and coercive questioning was the controlling
reason. However, as will be observed from the excerpts quoted
above the Court stresses that it is deciding only that the facts
before it are such as to render the confessions inadmissible as not
having been voluntary.
In United States v. Mitchell,t" decided two years later, the Court
apparently did not consider the McNabb decision as holding that
every confession obtained during illegal detention would of itself
be inadmissible, without a showing of further circumstances.
The Court referred to the criminal procedure statute found in the
McNabb case, which required that arresting officers must with
reasonable promptness bring arrested persons before a committing
authority; and then quoted from Justice Frankfurter as follows:
"... this procedural requirement checks resort to those reprehensible
practices known as the 'third degree' which, though universally re-
jected as indefensible, still find their way into use... A statute carry-
ing such purposes is expressive of a general legislative policy to which
courts should not be heedless when appropriate situations call for its
application.""
arrest a person charged with any crime or offense, to take the defendant before
the nearest United States commissioner or the nearest judicial officer having juris-
diction under existing laws for a hearing, commitment, or taking bail for trial..."
8 McNabb v. United States,supra note 6 at 341.
9 Id. at 347.
10322 U. S. 65 (1944).
11 McNabb v. United States, supra note 6 at 344.
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The Mitchell opinion then went on to say:
"In the circumstances of the McNabb case we found such an appro-
priate situation, in that the defendants were illegally detained under
aggravated circumstances.... Inexcusable detention for the purpose
of illegally extracting evidence from an accused, and the successful
extraction of such inculpatory statements by continuous questioning
for many hours under psychological pressure, were the decisive fea-
tures in the McNabb case which led us to rule that a conviction on
such evidence could not stand."'1 2
This construction was further emphasized by the holding of the
Court on the facts existing in the Mitchell case."
This was the state of the law as to the admissibility of confes-
sions obtained while in custody of officers, before arraignment,
when the recent case of Upshaw v. United States" arose. The sus-
pect in this case was taken into custody and held for thirty hours be-
fore he was brought before a magistrate for arraignment. During
this period he was questioned several times, but never for more
than thirty minutes at a time, and then by only one officer. At the
end of this period the prisoner confessed and was taken before a
magistrate. The defendant was convicted by the trial court and this
conviction was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia' 5 on the reasoning that while such deten-
tion was unlawful under Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Crim-
inal Procedure, 6 the confession was not obtained as the result of
such illegal detention, and therefore was voluntary and should not
be held inadmissible on that ground. On appeal the Supreme
12 Mitchell v. United States, supra note 10 at 69.
13 In this case Mitchell was arrested and confessed within a few minutes after
his arrival at the police station. He was then detained for eight days before he was
taken before a magistrate. The court held: "Here there was no disclosure induced
by illegal detention, no evidence was obtained in violation of any legal rights..
Id. at 70.
1469 Sup. Ct. 170 (1949).
15 Upshaw v. United States, 168 F. (2d) 167 (App. D. C. 1948).
16 Rule 5(a) reads: "An officer making arrest .., shall take the arrested per.
son without unnecessary delay before the nearest available committing magistrate."
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Court, in a five to four decision,17 reversed the conviction. While
purporting to follow the McNabb case the Court stated that "a
confession is inadmissible if made during illegal detention due
to failure promptly to carry a prisoner before a committing magis-
trate, whether or not the 'confession' is the result of torture, phys-
ical or psychological.""
The result of this decision, as pointed out in the dissent,"9 is
to declare that any confession obtained during an unlawful deten-
tion is per se inadmissible. It is believed that this conclusion is not
necessarily compelled by the McNabb case. As shown in the dis-
cussion of the Mitchell case above, the Court itself felt at this
time that a proper reading of the opinion in the McNabb case
required some stronger form of coercion than a mere retention
in violation of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Moreover, the
McNabb case appears clearly distinguishable from the Upshaw
case upon the facts. In the latter case there were no long sessions
of questioning, no pressure applied, and it did not appear that the
prisoner was held under unpleasant conditions. On the other hand,
in the McNabb case the "circumstances,"20 which were so strongly
relied upon by the Court, were clearly such as would be calculated
to frighten the uneducated defendants in the case, thereby causing
an unreliable confession.
What will be the probable result of such a decision on arresting
officers? The Rule of Criminal Procedure2 involved provides that
the officer must take the arrested person before the nearest avail-
able magistrate, without unnecessary delay. There is nowhere any
7 The majority opinion was written by Mr. Justice Black; Mr. Justice Reed
wrote a vigorous dissent in which he was joined by Mr. Chief Justice Vinson, Mr.
Justice Jackson, and Mr. Justice Burton.
18 Upshaw v. United States, supra note 14 at 172.
19 Id. at 179.
20 In the McNabb case the defendants were accused of shooting an internal
revenue agent. All of the McNabbs had only gone through the first few grades in
school, they had never been out of the county. These prisoners were taken and
questioned for long hours by a number of the deceased's fellow officers. They were
awakened at night for questioning and were returned to the place of the crime.
They were not allowed to see each other or any outside person.
21 Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
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indication as to what will be considered an unnecessary delay.
Presumably the decision will be left to the courts in each individ-
ual case. Thus law enforcement officers face a difficult choice.
Upon arresting a suspect, if they hold him even for a few hours,
they run the risk of having any confession which he may make, no
matter how voluntary, excluded because it was obtained during an
illegal detention. It frequently happens that at the moment of
arrest, the officers have not assembled adequate evidence upon
which a magistrate can hold a suspect. In a majority of cases it is
almost impossible to obtain such evidence without detaining the
accused for questioning and investigation. The alternatives open
to arresting officers: They can retain their prisoner for questioning
in the hope that the Court will find that under the circumstances
there was no unnecessary delay; or they can take him before the
magistrate immediately, without the necessary evidence, in which
case the probability is that the magistrate will be forced to release
him without preferring charges.
Exclusion of so-called involuntary confessions, such as the one
involved in the Upshaw case, may be based on one of two lines of
reasoning. First, that such confessions are not reliable and refusal
to admit them prevents the use of false evidence." Secondly, re-
stricting the admission of confessions which were not completely
voluntary tends to discourage the use by police officials of third
degree methods.
It is stated by Wigmore that "the principle upon which a con-
fession is treated as inadmissible is that under certain conditions
it becomes untrustworthy as testimony.""8 Such a circumstance
exists when in the mind of the accused false confession appears
less fraught with hazards than a continuation of the present
status.2" This was the basis upon which the early courts and writers
22 "The aim of the rule that a confession is inadmissible unless it was voluntarily
made is to exclude false evidence. Tests are invoked to determine whether the induce-
ment to speak was such that there is a fair risk the confession is false." Lisenba v.
California, supra note 5 at 236.
23 WIGMORE, EvIDENCE § 822 (3d ed. 1940).
24 "This possibility arises whenever the innocent person is placed in such a situa-
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based their exclusion of involuntary confessions."5 However, it
does not seem reasonable that mere detention by officers, with no
accompanying force or threats, either physical or psychological,
would constitute such a circumstance as would be likely to cause
a normal person to confess falsely in the hope of escaping the
existing circumstances.
Rejection of involuntary confessions as a means of punishment
for officials who do not adhere to the prescribed rules was not
stressed by the federal courts until the opinion in the McNabb case.
There it is pointed out that experience shows the necessity of pro-
tecting the accused from overzealous law enforcement officers.
Admission of the confession in the Upshaw case was denied on
the same reasoning. No mention was made in the opinion that this
confession should be considered unreliable because of the manner
in which it was obtained. The reason which was stressed as the
basis for the decision was that the statement was obtained during
an illegal detention, and while the prisoner was admittedly being
held for the purpose of obtaining such information.
The courts may well have made an unwise decision in selecting
this method of disciplining law enforcement officers. While punish-
ing law enforcement agents for disregarding the prescribed pro-
cedure in regard to arrests, they may very well allow a man who
has committed some serious offense against the laws of the United
States to go free for lack of evidence, when the prosecution has
his own confession voluntarily made and thoroughly reliable, even
though obtained during an illegal detention. The result of such
action is, in effect, not to punish the law enforcement officers in-
dividually, but to inflict the punishment upon society as a whole
by turning loose in its midst criminals who by their own admis-
sions should be incarcerated. Elizabeth Gann.
tion that the untrue acknowledgment of guilt is at the time the more promising of
two alternatives between which he is obliged to choose; that is, he chooses any risk
that may be in falsely acknowledging guilt, in preference to some worse alternative
associated with silence." Ibid.
s Cases cited note 5 supra. 2 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL EvIDENCE 1 622 (11th ed.
1912).
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